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As the dust settles from the contentious, controversial and lengthy 2000
presidential election, the following questions loom large in Illinois:
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•

Is something dramatically wrong with Illinois’ election process?

•

If so, what needs to be changed?

•

Could the chaos in Florida be replicated in Illinois in a future
presidential election?

If one believes the self-appointed experts in the media, the various public
interest groups, and even the casual observer, the nation’s electoral
system is in shambles and decisive changes are needed now. Some favor a
nationalization of the process, whether it involves standardized voting
systems, uniform poll closing hours, common recount procedures, or
uniform voter registration laws. Others contend that states themselves
need to take aggressive actions, particularly those, like Illinois, which rely
primarily upon those dreaded punch card voting devices. They hope that
the dreaded word “chad” never appears again in election vocabulary.

What do we know for sure?

The mission of the Center
for Governmental Studies
includes education of the
public on important public
policy issues. This article is
one in a series of policy
briefs designed to provide an
objective view of an issue.

First, we know this was the closest
presidential election in our lifetime, but
not in the life of the nation. As one
statistician put it, the difference between
the votes for the presidential candidates
was smaller than the margin of error in
the voting system. Similar situations
occurred in 1824, 1876, and 1888. In
each case, a candidate who lost the
popular vote won the electoral college
vote and was elected president. Each of
those elections was marked with
controversy and bitterness, but
constitutional and statutory provisions
were such that the nation not only
survived, but it also prospered. We
should expect nothing less now.

Second, elections are not now, nor will
they ever be, anything close to a perfect
process. They are complicated
mechanisms with hundreds of thousands
of fallible humans working on election
day and night in over 3,000 counties and
200,000 polling sites. Some are full time
and well-trained professionals, but most
(such as election judges in the polling
place) are part time with varying
degrees of commitment, education, and
training. Further complicating the task
are over 100 million voters, some who
vote prior to election day, and others
who do not follow instructions in the
polling place.
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While the number of problems and
mistakes can be minimized in such a
situation, they can never be completely
eliminated.

Could Illinois suffer an election
debacle like Florida?
What happened in Florida could have
occurred in Illinois, but for several
reasons Illinois probably would have
weathered the storm much better.
Illinois’ laws and constitutional provisions
are not identical to those of Florida.
Illinois has an independent State Board of
Elections that provides direction,
coordination, and uniformity to the
electoral process throughout the state;
Florida has a small and relatively
ineffective elections office. In Illinois,
loose chad is required to be cleaned off
punch cards before they are put through
the card counter; Florida has no such
requirement.

DuPage and Lake counties will begin use
of the optical scan in lieu of punch cards.
Illinois thus is experiencing a slow but
discernable shift away from the old
technology to the slightly more advanced
scan systems.
Optical scan systems vary in how the
votes are counted. In some, ballots are
scanned and votes counted in the
precinct; in others, the scanning and
counting is done at a central location after
the polls are closed. This distinction is
important: when ballots are scanned in

table one

the precinct, each ballot is scanned as it
is cast and any ballot which containes
overvotes for any office is returned to the
voter for possible correction (this error
notification feature does not apply to
undervotes since so many of these are
due to voter intention to abstain from
voting for certain offices). Use of this
error notification feature reduces the
number of ballots not counted due to
voter error.
As Table 1 reports, ten of Illinois’ 13
jurisdictions using an optical scan

Illinois Election Jurisdictions Using Optical
Scan Voting Systems

Jurisdiction

When Began

In-Precinct
Tabulation

Program
Vendor*

DeKalb County

1999

Yes

GBS

Douglas County

1999

Yes

GBS

How are votes cast and counted in
Illinois?

Franklin County

1999

Yes

GBS

Hamilton County

1993

No

ES&S

In even numbered years, when national
and state government officers are being
elected, only two types of voting systems
are used in Illinois: punch cards and
optical scan. In odd numbered years,
when only local officials are elected,
some smaller counties use paper ballots
since they are more economical and voter
turnout is much smaller.

Jasper County

1998

Yes

GBS

Madison County

2000

Yes

ES&S

McDonough County

1999

Yes

GBS

McHenry County

2000

Yes

GBS

Schuyler County

2000

Yes

GBS

City of E St. Louis

1997

No

ES&S

Ninety seven of Illinois’ election
jurisdictions used punch cards in the
2000 presidential election, with the
remaining 13 deploying optical scan
systems. (See Table 1 for an identification
of the optical scan jurisdictions.)
Beginning with the 2001 local elections,

City of Galesburg

1997

Yes

ES&S

City of Peoria

1993

No

ES&S

City of Rockford

2000

Yes

ES&S

* Key (machine vendor):

GBS - Governmental Business Systems
ES&S - Election Systems & Software
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system also employed
tabulation of votes cast.

in-

precinct

What kinds of election law changes
are needed in Illinois?

Legislation is currently pending in the
Illinois General Assembly, that would
allow this same error notification procedure
to be used in the advanced punch card
systems recently purchased by the City of
Chicago and Cook County. However,
none of the other 95 jurisdictions which
used punch cards in the 2000 general
election now have this upgraded hardware
and software. Without further expenditure
to upgrade their present systems, these 95
counties could not use this advanced
feature even if its use is approved by the
legislature.

Six kinds of election law changes would
go far toward improving Illinois’ election
system and minimizing the risk that
Illinois would have to endure an election
debacle such as that which afflicted
Florida’s presidential election in 2000.

So could Illinois still experience an
election breakdown like the 2000
Florida election?

Much has been written about Florida’s
chad problems, and the conclusion of
some is to outlaw the punch card system
nationwide. That would be a mistake.
Although punch cards are not cutting edge
technology, they do have a reputation for
accuracy. If vote recorders are properly
maintained and if any chad is removed
from the cards before counting, punch
card systems will produce an accurate
vote every single time.

Even with improved voting technology,
Illinois (and other states as well) share
enough common problems with Florida
that a razor thin statewide election
outcome could result in the same quagmire
of endless litigation without any clear
means of reaching a just and timely final
conclusion.
As we know, no voting system will ever be
perfect, but it is equally true that every
voting system can be improved. Thus, with
public interest currently focused on
election shortcomings, now is the time for
a critical analysis of Illinois’ election
process. Some changes are necessary, but
radical surgery is far from needed. As
someone once said, “You don’t want to use
a sledgehammer to kill a fly.”

1. Upgrade Illinois’ voting
systems
What should be done with the punch
card system?

Furthermore, punch cards are relatively
inexpensive, they are easy to store and
transport, they can handle the large
number of candidates that regularly
appear on Illinois ballots, and they are
quite familiar to most Illinois voters. Also,
they leave a paper trail that allows for a
recount by machine or by hand.
But obviously punch card systems are not
without their problems. Recent reports
indicate that Cook County and Chicago
voters failed to cast a valid vote for
president in record numbers during the
2000 presidential election. These
undervotes, which accounted for 6.2

percent of all ballots cast, were on punch
cards and were particularly acute in
African American and Hispanic
neighborhoods. Was the punch card
system too confusing for the many first
time voters in these areas? Did voters not
understand how the system worked? At
present no one knows for certain what
happened.
As mentioned earlier, legislation now
pending in the Illinois General Assembly
will allow new technology to be added to
punch cards that will permit instant
tabulation in the precinct and reject ballots
that contain overvotes or are otherwise
incapable of being recorded. The voter can
then make any necessary corrections.
Thus, rather than eliminating a system that
has stood the test of time well, the General
Assembly needs to authorize (read accept)
this new punch card technology.

What about other voting system
technologies?
Illinois voters now vote on only two
different types of systems: the punch card
(about 90%) and optical scan (about 10%).
With the old lever voting machines and
paper ballots now relics of the past, the
General Assembly needs to authorize a
new type of voting system - commonly
known as “touch screen” voting. A recent
survey by the Gartner Group concluded
that Americans are generally willing to try
new technologies for voting, and that the
“touch screen,” which is as familiar to
them as their local automatic teller
machine (ATM), is the type with which
they would be most comfortable. It makes
little sense for other states to use touch
screen systems while their use is
prohibited in Illinois. Local election
jurisdictions in Illinois should at least have
the opportunity to decide whether “touch
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screen” voting makes economic,
administrative, and practical sense.

2. Direct more attention to
judges of election
The 55,000 election judges who work a
15-18 hour day and barely make minimum
wage are the backbone of any Illinois
election. Better-trained and better-paid
election judges are essential. Having
quality personnel in each polling place is
the first and best line of defense against the
kinds of errors that lead to election
disputes. The following deserve serious
consideration:
•

Double the amount paid to election
judges, with the state picking up the
major portion of the increase. The
current statewide average of $100
per judge per election is far too low.

•

Give more attention to training
programs. Although the State Board
of Elections conducted 221 training
schools in 1999 and 2000 (a record
number), not all judges statewide
could be included. Election suppliers
and election authorities need to
upgrade and expand their own
programs.

•

The Illinois General Assembly
should consider adopting the
“administrative judge” concept
for Illinois elections. An administrative judge, who would be
required to have extra training and
receive additional pay, should be
appointed to manage each polling
place.

3. Establish state-wide criteria
defining what constitutes a
vote
In Florida, the law requires a court to
determine the intent of the voter, but that
requirement evidently is not accompanied
by any instructions or criteria defining
how to do it. Practices apparently not
only varied from county to county, but
also within counties as well. This
obviously led to mass confusion and
ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court
ruling that these varying standards
violated the constitution’s equal
protection clause.
Illinois law allows a manual recount by
court order to determine what is a valid
vote, and the intent of the voter is
paramount. But although a substantial
amount of case law has evolved
concerning the interpretation of marks
on paper ballots, the same kind of rigor
has never been applied to questions that
might arise in recounts of votes cast with
punch card or optical scan systems. An
objective set of standards for determining
voter intent that is applicable to all types
of voting systems could be accomplished
by statute or even by rules promulgated
by the State Board of Elections.

4. Provide more effective
programs of voter education
It is indeed disturbing to hear claims that
voters were “confused” by certain ballot
layout schemes or were “befuddled” by
the type of voting system used in a
polling place. The success of an election
depends, not just on educating voters on
candidates and issues, but also on:
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•
•
•
•

how to register to vote,
where to vote,
how to vote absentee,
how to read instructions in the
polling place, and
• how to ask for help.
When voters can’t, won’t, or don’t
follow instructions — and thus vote in
such a manner that their intent cannot be
decisively determined — there is no
option but not to count their ballots. To
minimize the likelihood of such an
outcome, the following measures could
be employed:
•

Send a voter’s guide to all
registered voters prior to an
election. Such a guide could list
the candidates and issues on the
ballot, give the location of polling
places, and provide instructions
covering the topics listed in the
above paragraph.

•

Consider the use of more radio
and television announcements
telling voters how to vote.

•

Require election judges to ask
each voter if she or he needs
help understanding how the
voting process works. Make
certain that sample ballots are
freely available for inspection in
the polling place, and that the
judges are pro-active in their
desire to aid any and every voter
in a strictly non-partisan
environment.
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5. Encourage Congress to
adopt certain electoral
reforms and to resist efforts
to nationalize the voting
process

•

The 2000 election has already led to calls
for the federal government to mandate
stricter national standards controlling
such election procedures as ballots,
voting systems, polling hours, and
recount procedures. Such an approach is
a recipe for disaster.
Elections have always been ad-ministered
at the state level and for good reason. A
decentralized system allows for much
needed flexibility and innovation; it
minimizes Congress’ role in the process
by which the members of Congress are
chosen; and it recognizes that different
political cultures in each state are best
served by locally designed election
systems. Further, after over 200 years of a
state-based electoral process, a
standardized national system would be
politically unpalatable and may be
difficult to implement.
But this doesn’t mean that Congress
shouldn’t play an important role in the
reform process. For example, it could do
the following:
•

Give the Federal Election
Commission the legal authority
and necessary funding to update the
current voluntary standards for
voting systems. These standards
have been in effect for ten years
and have been adopted by some
states. They have been extraordinarily helpful in some
instances, but the work of the FEC
needs to be upgraded and even
accelerated.

•

•

The FEC could also be mandated to
analyze the frequency and cause of
undervotes and overvotes in each
type of voting system used across
the country. Such an analysis could
include whether these voting
anomalies occurred more frequently
with certain types of voting systems
and also in certain areas.
Recommendations could then be
made as to how such systems might
be improved or even whether they
should continue to be used.
Congress should authorize the use
of social security numbers in the
election process. The use of these
numbers is critical for the maintenance of clean voter registration
rolls; it would thus minimize the
potential for fraud. It makes no
sense that election officials are
prohibited from using complete
social security numbers while
Congress has permitted their use by
state motor vehicle departments and
the courts with no adverse results.
Finally, Congress needs to provide
funding to improve the election
system. Most election funding now
comes from county governments.
As might be expected, those
counties with the most limited
resources usually decide to spend
their monies on improving roads
and meeting various social service
needs rather than on new voting
systems. Federal block grants to
states for the purchase of new
voting equipment, for training
election judges, and for voter
education would be a relatively
small investment that could
bring big returns in voter
confidence in the electoral system.

6. Consider the development
of a statewide voter
registration file
Many states have already embarked on,
or even finished, a program which links
county voter registration rolls to a
computerized statewide voter database.
This enables the state to compare
information across counties, and also
with death records, in order to cleanse
voter registration rolls. Illinois could
save substantial monies in printing and
postage and could also reduce the
potential for vote fraud by adopting such
a file.
The concept of a statewide file often
evokes concerns from county clerks and
other election authorities who think that
“big brother” in Springfield would
gradually erode all of their election and
registration duties. Nothing could be
further from the truth. County clerks
would still accept and process voter
registration applications and would
retain responsibility for daily
maintenance of their records. But the
existence of a statewide file would
guarantee that voter registration rolls
would be much cleaner, more accurate,
and thus less subject to vote fraud.

What would all this accomplish?
The problems with the 2000 election do
not mean that the electoral system is
broken or needs a major overhaul, but
they do suggest that it needs attention.
Since the system has worked for so
many years with surprisingly few
problems, any changes in it should be
evolutionary and not revolutionary.
Further, care must be taken to assure that
any changes made will not produce
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unintended consequences that will, in any
way, threaten the integrity of the process.

Ronald D. Michaelson, a recipient of a
doctoral degree in government from

Still, the public’s concerns with the
trustworthiness of the system must be
addressed in a reasoned and thoughtful
way. Careful consideration of the above
suggestions for change would further
strengthen the electoral process in Illinois
and make it less likely, though not
impossible, that Illinois would ever
experience the chaos that occurred in
Florida in the memorable 2000 presidential
election.

Southern Illinois University Carbondale, has been the Executive
Director of the Illinois State Board of
Elections since 1976. He was invited to
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